From the NPR story ....
"deaths from the synthetic opioid continued to rise to catastrophic levels during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021 and 2022, ....."

Oh, they dropped under Biden from the catastrophic numbers under Biden.
Create a problem and somebody says 'we've got a problem.'
Hang a banner.

The numbers are down under Trump.

And the Factcheck.org .......

"The FBI that day released data collected from local law enforcement agencies showing that both violent and property crime nationwide declined from 2024 to 2025, with the largest one-year drops in the violent crime and murder rates since the FBI began publishing these estimates in 1936.

The president accurately cited those large one-year reductions"

Violent crime is down.

If only someone had woken him up.

So he went to MBZ, the leader of the UAE. He was highly concerned about an attack that could lead to more or less what has happened over the last three years: a catastrophic attack on Israel, followed by horrific retaliation against Hamas in Gaza and leading to a regional war. He told the intermediary to get the message to the Israelis. He did that at the security and defense level. But the warnings were fairly vague and not much happened in response to the warnings. Netanyahu was briefed on the message and the meetings, as would be the norm.

A key backdrop to all of this is that Israel did not take Hamas seriously as a military threat. They took Hezbollah very seriously, as a de facto state/army. Hamas was different, basically a terrorist threat which could fire off homemade rockets and mount terrorist attacks, but not a true military threat. So I think it’s fair to say that when they heard Hamas was warning of something big they simply didn’t believe the scale they were later able to pull off. They apparently decided that Hamas would try to get possession of Israeli academic Elizabeth Tsurkov who had been kidnapped in Iraq and was being held hostage there. (She was eventually released in September 2025.) In any case, MBZ didn’t get the reaction he wanted. But he was also afraid that a more specific warning to the Israelis might prompt a massive preemptive attack on Hamas in Gaza. He wanted to know more. So he sent the intermediary back to find more details and to talk to Sinwar.

The intermediary talked again to Sinwar who gave a more direct and grave message. The intermediary and then MBZ got the message that some sort of catastrophic attack was planned. So MBZ made the decision to talk to Netanyahu directly. He conveyed all this in a 45 minute call between the two men. The kicker here is that Netanyahu did not brief any of his security or defense officials on this outreach. Of course they’d already gotten a version of the message. But the direct contact from a the leader of the UAE obviously showed a different level of urgency and gravity. The argument, and it’s a pretty good one, is that if Netanyahu had briefed the heads of Mossad, the Shin Bet and the IDF about this call they would have taken more aggressive protective measures.

To cite just one example, in the hours just before the October 7 attack, Israel saw something was happening in Gaza. Security officials met to evaluate it and they decided it was likely a drill and not to mobilize. Of course, it was not a drill. It was the beginning mobilization for the attack. These are all what ifs of course. But it does not seem implausible that if Netanyahu had briefed these officials on this warning that that conclusion arrived at in those overnight meetings might have been different and Israel could have had some level of military response in place when the attack started.