I'm not the one who supported the guy. 😂

He was not found guilty of sexual assault! He was found liable of sexual abuse! Get it right!

Mr. No one in Mn, 

I hope to answer your inquiries.

The jury did not find Trump liable for “rape” under the New York statutory definition. It found him liable for "sexual abuse," which was one of the alternative theories of battery submitted to the jury.

1. What exactly did the Carroll jury decide?
In E. Jean Carroll v. Donald Trump, the federal jury in New York was given a special verdict form with three alternative theories for the battery claim:

Whether Trump raped Carroll;
Whether Trump sexually abused Carroll; or
Whether Trump forcibly touched Carroll.
Judge Lewis Kaplan instructed the jury using the applicable New York statutory definitions. In particular, the New York definition of rape at the time required penile-vaginal penetration. The judge expressly told the jury that if it found that Trump did not penetrate Carroll with his penis, it had to answer “No” to the rape question and proceed to the sexual-abuse question.
 
The jury returned:

Rape: No
Sexual abuse: Yes
Injury resulting from the conduct: Yes
Compensatory damages: $2 million
Punitive damages: $20,000
The Second Circuit subsequently described the verdict the same way: the jury found Trump liable for sexual abuse, not rape.

So, if by “sexual assault” you mean the ordinary, nontechnical description of what happened, it is reasonable to describe the verdict as finding sexual assault. But “sexual assault” was not the specific verdict category the jury checked. The legally precise verdict was sexual abuse/battery.

2. Did the New York-law instructions affect the verdict?
Yes, in a very direct legal sense.

The instructions defined the precise legal questions the jury was answering. Most importantly, the New York definition of rape required penile penetration. The evidence concerning Carroll included her allegation that Trump digitally penetrated her, rather than penile penetration.

Consequently, the jury could believe that Trump forcibly penetrated her with his fingers and still legally be required to answer “No” to the rape question under the definition the judge gave it.

The judge's post-verdict opinion explained this distinction: the jury's “No” on rape did not mean the jury believed there had been no sexual penetration; it meant that Carroll had not established penile penetration, which was an element of the statutory offense of rape.
 
There's an important limitation, though: we cannot say that the instructions caused the jury to reach a particular factual conclusion. We can say that the instructions determined the legal meaning of the questions the jury was answering.

3. What about Judge Kaplan later saying the jury found digital penetration?
This is where the issue becomes more complicated.

The jury was not asked a separate question saying, “Did Trump digitally penetrate Carroll's vagina?” It was asked whether he “sexually abused” her.

Judge Kaplan subsequently concluded that the jury's sexual-abuse finding, combined with the damages award and the evidence at trial, meant that the jury had necessarily found digital penetration.

That conclusion was later upheld by the Second Circuit. The appellate court noted that Trump had not requested a separate jury finding identifying the specific sexual conduct constituting the sexual abuse. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), the court therefore had authority to make a finding on that issue. The Second Circuit held that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
 
So there are actually two different things:

The jury's finding: Trump sexually abused Carroll.
The judge's subsequent factual/legal determination: the conduct underlying that finding included forcible digital penetration.
The second was not literally a finding written on the jury's verdict form, although the appellate court ultimately accepted the judge's determination.

4. Now to your question about other state law
This is a very important distinction.

Suppose an Illinois civil case went to a jury, the jury was properly instructed under the law applicable to the case, and the jury found the defendant not liable.

A judge generally could not simply say afterward:

“If this case had been tried under New York law instead, I would have found you liable.”
That would not ordinarily change the Illinois judgment. The jury decided the case under the law that the court determined was applicable.

But there is a significant qualification: an Illinois court can sometimes determine that another state's law should govern the dispute. Illinois uses a “most significant relationship” approach in tort choice-of-law questions. When the law of two states differs in a way that could affect the outcome, an Illinois court conducts a choice-of-law analysis to determine which state's law applies.
 
That determination normally occurs before the jury is instructed, because the jury needs to know what legal standards to apply.

In other words:
Proper scenario:
Judge: “Illinois choice-of-law rules require us to apply New York law to this issue.”

Then:
Jury: “Here are the facts. Here is the New York law. We find liability.”

That's perfectly possible.

Very different scenario:
Judge: “I instructed the jury under Illinois law, and the jury found no liability. But if New York law had applied, I personally think the defendant would have been liable.”

That statement might be a legal observation or hypothetical, but it does not itself turn the jury's verdict into a liability finding.

And if the judge were actually attempting to enter judgment against the defendant despite the jury's verdict, that would raise a very different and much more serious procedural issue.

5. Why the distinction matters in the Trump/Carroll case
The Carroll case wasn't an out of state case in which a judge substituted New York law after an out of state jury verdict.

It was a federal case in New York involving conduct that occurred in New York, and the jury was instructed on New York law from the outset. The jury therefore made its decision according to those New York definitions.

The unusual part was the difference between the statutory term “rape” and the broader everyday understanding of rape/sexual assault.

The jury essentially said:
No, you haven't proven “rape” as that particular New York statute defined it.

But it simultaneously said:
Yes, you have proven sexual abuse sufficient to impose civil battery liability.

That is not internally contradictory once you understand the statutory definitions.

Bottom line
Did the New York-law instructions matter? Yes. They controlled the legal definitions the jury had to apply.
Did the jury find Trump liable for rape? No.
Did the jury find him liable for sexual abuse? Yes.
Did the jury find him liable for a civil battery based on sexual misconduct? Yes.
Did the jury itself expressly find “digital penetration”? Not in a separate interrogatory. Judge Kaplan later made that finding based on the verdict and evidence, and the Second Circuit upheld it.
 
Could an Illinois judge, after an Illinois jury found no liability, simply replace that result by saying New York law would have produced liability? Not merely because the judge preferred the New York result. The court would first have to determine, under applicable choice-of-law principles, that New York law actually governed the relevant issue. If the jury had already decided liability under the legally applicable law, a post-verdict hypothetical about what another state's law might have produced would not itself change the verdict. Illinois courts recognize that choice-of-law is a legal determination based on the jurisdictions' relationships to the dispute.