Hello, Hal.
Can you share some details as to the effectiveness of these programs and why they haven’t been adopted on a larger scale here in the states?
Short answer: results are mixed but often promising—when the shift is well-targeted and well-implemented. The strongest evidence comes from a few categories:
1) Civilian first-response for mental/behavioral health (money moved from patrol to clinicians/medics).
Denver’s clinician-led STAR program cut police-reported low-level offenses in treated areas without increasing serious crime, according to peer-reviewed analyses; city and Urban Institute reports also document smooth implementation and cost advantages.
Eugene’s long-running CAHOOTS diverted thousands of 911 calls from police; recent research finds it can substitute for some police responses and reduce costs while maintaining safety.
Albuquerque’s Community Safety department is scaling non-police responders for behavioral health and low-risk calls, with city reports showing growing diversion capacity.
2) Community Violence Intervention (CVI) / “violence interrupters.”
Evaluations of Cure Violence / Safe Streets show site-to-site variation: some neighborhoods see meaningful drops in shootings/homicides; others show null results. Recent Baltimore work finds reductions in several sites, while St. Louis reported no significant effect early on. New meta-/scoping reviews emphasize implementation quality as a key driver.
3) Focused deterrence (a hybrid of enforcement + services).
While not a pure “defund” model, it’s the most consistently effective prevention strategy studied: multiple Campbell/peer-review reviews find moderate, reliable reductions in violent crime when attention and services are concentrated on the small group driving violence.
4) Public-health, citywide prevention (e.g., Glasgow/Scotland).
Scotland’s long public-health push (VRU) coincided with large drops in homicide/serious violence over the 2005–2018 period, but researchers note multiple contributing factors and cautions about attributing all gains to the reallocation alone.
What this means for “reallocate vs. police”
Targeted reallocation works best. Moving some calls to trained civilian teams and funding credible-messenger outreach can reduce low-level crime, cut arrests, and, in some places, shootings—if programs are well staffed, integrated with 911, and consistently funded.
Expect heterogeneous outcomes. CVI effects vary widely by neighborhood and fidelity; treating it as a plug-and-play replacement usually disappoints.
Keeping an enforcement backstop matters. The best-evidenced violence reductions come from focused deterrence, which pairs limited, precise enforcement pressure with real services—i.e., rebalancing resources rather than abandoning policing.
If you want, I can sketch a sample reallocation mix (e.g., % to civilian response, % to CVI, % to data-driven hot-spots/focused-deterrence) and the metrics cities track (call diversion rate, use-of-force incidents, shootings per 100k, response times, program cost per diverted call).
There are a few overlapping reasons why more towns and communities haven’t widely implemented large-scale reallocations from traditional law enforcement to prevention-focused programs—most of them come down to money, politics, uncertainty, and logistics:
1. Political & Cultural Resistance
“Defunding” stigma: Even if a program isn’t about abolishing police, shifting funds away from police budgets can trigger political backlash, especially in communities with strong support for law enforcement or where crime fears are high.
Police union influence: Unions often lobby hard against budget reallocations that reduce staffing or overtime, framing them as threats to public safety.
Public perception: Many residents equate “more officers” with “more safety,” making it harder to sell prevention programs that don’t look like traditional policing.
2. Budget Structure & Funding Rules
Earmarked funds: Police budgets are often locked into multi-year labor contracts and pension obligations, leaving little discretionary money to shift.
One-time grants vs. sustained funding: Federal or philanthropic grants can start pilot programs, but ongoing local funding is harder to secure once initial money runs out.
Fragmented responsibilities: Mental health, housing, and social services are often funded and managed separately from public safety, so shifting resources requires cross-department coordination that many cities aren’t set up for.
3. Implementation Challenges
911 call triage: To divert calls, dispatch systems need to accurately distinguish which situations don’t require police—a skill that requires retraining and upgraded technology.
Workforce shortages: Hiring trained clinicians, outreach workers, and violence interrupters is hard in a tight labor market; burnout is also high in these fields.
Integration with police: Programs work best when police and alternative responders coordinate, but building trust between them can take years.
4. Evidence Gaps & Risk Aversion
Uneven results: While some programs (like Denver’s STAR) show strong benefits, others (like certain Cure Violence sites) have mixed or null results. This variability makes cautious city leaders hesitant to gamble scarce funds.
Local fit concerns: A program that works in Denver or Glasgow might not translate smoothly to a smaller rural town or a city with different crime patterns.
Fear of blame: If a city cuts police funding and crime spikes—even for unrelated reasons—politicians risk losing their jobs.
5. Short-Term vs. Long-Term Payoffs
Prevention is slow: It can take years for prevention to reduce crime measurably, but political and media pressures demand quick results.
Crisis response bias: Leaders often prioritize visible, immediate responses (patrols, arrests) over investments that quietly reduce harm over time.
If you want, I can map out case studies of cities that tried these shifts but faced setbacks—including exactly what obstacles stopped them—so you can see the recurring patterns that keep these programs from scaling.
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