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A lot of information revealed in this article by the Illini Inquirer's Joey Wagner. The keyword: "drop coverage", which Coach Underwood admitted in the postgame press conference as something he didn't quite expect.
In ball screen defense, drop coverage is often used counter the on-ball screen offense where the screener doesn't have a mid-range game (that is Kofi, he can roll to the basket after setting up a pick but no way he would take a 15-feet jumper).
Drop coverage can be separated into two separate categories: "deep" drop (which Coach Underwood specifically mentioned) and "aggressive" drop. "Deep drop" is used if the ball handler can drive to the basket but does not shoot the ball well from the distance. The on-ball defender move under the screen to stop the ball handler's dribble penetration. Loyola played deep drop to stop Illini's screener (that's Kofi) from moving toward the basket and to limit the ball handler (Curbello)'s ability to penetrate deep, because Curbello has been good at drive to make layups, making passes to Kofi the rolling screener, but does not have range.
Loyola also mixed "hedge and recover" or "aggressive drop" defense if the ball handler is Trent Frazier. By playing "hedge and recover", Loyola's defender of the screener (often Cameron Krutwig, who is an AP All-America 3rd team selection) will move out to chase the ball handler and wait for the on-ball defender to chase or to "recover" his original defensive position before moving back to guard the screener. This "hedge and recover" would form a temporary pocket surrounding Frazier, and took away Frazier's ability to make offensive decision after the screen - we saw that Frazier would be forced to dribble back out and pass the ball to the other side. "Aggressive drop" would have Krutwig to temporarily guard Frazier, using his length to disrupt Frazier's attempt to shoot from distance.
Defensively, Loyola also had traps in the low post, in anticipation of Kofi's hard fights for low post position, so we often saw that Illini's entry pass to Kofi being disrupted and Ayo was often the victim on the "turnover" column. Loyola also was able to disrupt Illini guards' move to catch-and-shoot by making them run harder.
On the offense, Loyola's players can execute that weak-side, high post double screens with all advanced options and at 120% precision. That setting fully utilize Krutwig's capability to pass or to shoot from high post, to cut to the basketball, or to make a low-post, back-to-the-basket scoring move.
Loyola can do any one of the following options:
1. Krutwig on high post, with the ball, make a mid-range jumper or floater because Kofi did not guard him closely;
2. After the point guard pass to Krutwig who is at high post, Krutwig could make a bounce pass to one of the screeners, who rolled to the basket after setting up a screen for the weak-side wing player running a curl;
3. Krutwig could also give the ball back and make a backdoor cut to the basket, and the Loyola guard timely made a lob pass for Krutwig's layup;
4. The weak-side wing player running a curl can eliminate his defender (often Frazier or Adam Miller) using the double screen, create an open three-point shot;
5. That wing player can also dribble drive to the basket, either attack the rim himself (there was one such play in the early game, and Kofi caught him and blocked the shot), or pass to Krutwig who can either shoot or move to the hoop to catch for a layup - that option may also be one of the screeners, who can either shoot or cut to the basket.
6. That can also create mismatch for Krutwig down low, allowing 6-9, 255lbs Krutwig to go against smaller players such as Jacob Grandison who only has a 6-6 and 205lbs body frame but was often the second tallest Illini player on the court.
With all those possible options, Loyola-Chicago as a team can read Illini's defense stances and react quickly to counter Illini's defense. This made Illini's defense suffering, as we often saw that Illini players had to chase their defensive assignments from behind.
Because Loyola can make high percentage shots, that also took away Illini's transition game and limited Ayo's firepower in open court - it's surely difficult to get running if your opponent shot 57% from the floor and you have been chasing from behind.
All these indicate that Illini's pre-game preparation was somehow, somewhat insufficient.
Compare that to Krutwig's post-game statement "no one was doing anything out of their body, out of their mind, we just stuck to the game plan”, and Porter Moser said that “. . . it wasn’t just the last 48 hours . . . a lot of stuff we’ve done was hard work in the summer, hard work in the offseason, this just wasn’t something the flips just switched the last 48 hours. These guys have invested in what we do and they believe in it." I'd say that is highly respectable, in terms of adherence to strict disciplines in defense strategies.
Loyola doesn't want to be Cinderella - they are sending the signal to the remaining 15 teams in the field: this time, they are the Goliath, the Prima Donna.
Based on the above, I think the right reaction from fans should be this: "Despite under-prepared against a very strong and respectable opponent who may well be Final Four worthy or title contender worthy, these Illini kids on the court were only 3 possessions behind Loyola throughout the bulk of the game, and despite Loyola's perfect execution of their game plan, Kofi still managed to score 20 points in the paint, Curbello still managed to make plays on pick-n-rolls, Adam Miller as a freshman and a third or fourth option still managed to score in double digits with high percentage, and the entire team held their composure till the end, and did not collapse like Kansas Jayhawks 24 hours later - should we not blame these kids for not playing harder?"
In the world of college basketball, especially in the Big Dance, coaching staff's pre-game preparation, strategy and counter-strategy, based on season-long efforts, is often the key to success, and this is what makes college basketball worth watching, even from the other side of the Pacific Ocean.
Coach Underwood is certainly responsible. That is a painful lesson for him, which I wish that should have better happened last year this time, instead of this year. No coach is born to be a championship-caliber coach - Coaches are just like us ordinary persons, we are all fallible mortal beings, and we need to learn our lessons, improve, come back and be a better person. Gregg Popovich is now widely regarded as one of the greatest who's ever coached the pro game, but probably not many remembered that when he first took over San Antonio Spurs in 1997, he was often stymied by in-game improvisations from seasoned veteran coaches like Phil Jackson or Don Nelson, and lost winnable games occasionally.
Coach Underwood is also equally responsible for turning around the Illini basketball program, and it was not just recruiting better players to come. We all witnessed the improvements of individual Illini players and team operation on the court, which is real.
I have met Timothy Killeen, President of the University of Illinois System and Robert Jones, Chancellor of the University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana in person. If they ever come back to Taipei to meet alumni, I would tell them, "don't listen to that guy on Daily Herald because Coach Underwood has been good and deserves to kept."